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recognition to a factual situation not uncommon in the business world. A decision
on facts would not lead to such an extreme result as the Oklahoma case of Ardmore
Paint and Oil Products Co. v. State Ind. ComM'n.25 where compensation benefits were
awarded to a partner who was the only active member of a husband-wife partnership
and who managed the business alone. Such a case would easily be handled on analogy
to the Bowne case so that only persons who are bona fide employees of the partnership
firm and in fact subject to the control of the employing firm would be covered by
the act. Courts of most jurisdictions in the United States have handled such factual
distinctions without too much difficulty in the corporation cases, and it is reasonable
to presume they could do the same where partnerships are involved.
If this advance in judicial thinking is followed it will operate to benefit the class
of persons intended to be benefited by the Workmen's Compensation Act; it will
eliminate the unrealistic results of deciding cases mechanically on a narrow aggregate
theory or on an equally narrow entity theory; and it will substitute therefore realistic
decisions based on the actual facts of the relationship as it exists and operates.
-Frances-lana Mackay.
SALES: IMPLIED WARRANTY-FuRNISHING OF BLOOD BY A HOSPITAL FOR A
TRANSFUSION.-The New York Court of Appeals in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital1
recently held in a 4-3 decision, that a hospital which furnishes blood for a transfusion
does not impliedly warrant such blood to be free from harmful ingredients, because
the furnishing of the blood did not constitute a sale.
The plaintiff, a patient in the defendant hospital received a transfusion of blood
for which she paid $60. The blood furnished by the hospital contained jaundice
virus, and the transfusion of this contaminated blood resulted in the plaintiff's
becoming infected with the disease. The plaintiff brought an action against the
defendant hospital for breach of implied warranty. Defendant moved to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint for failing to state a cause of action. This motion was denied by
the two lower courts. The Court of Appeals in granting the motion found, as a
matter of law, that in a transfusion the transfer of blood is incidental to the service
rendered. Since service predominates, the transfer of the blood is not a sale; there
being no sale, there is no implied warranty that the blood transferred is fit for a
transfusion.
If this blood had been sold, there would have been an implied warranty that the
blood was fit for a transfusion, under section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act and the
plaintiff would have prevailed. 2 A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller
transfers the property in the goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.3
However, not all transfers of property for a price constitute a sale. If the transfer
of the property is merely incidental to the performance of a contract for work and
labor the transaction would not be a sale.4 In the Perlmutter case the hospital trans-
ferred the blood to the patient for a consideration of $60. Therefore the transaction
" 109 Okla. 81, 234 Pac. 582 (1925).
1308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
'UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15(1) provides: "Where the buyer expressly or by implication makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment . . ., there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." This section is embodied in NEw YORK PERSONAL
PROPERTY LAW § 96 (1). The implied warranty of this section applies to all sales of goods. Rinadli
v. Mohican, 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918).
1 NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 82(2).
'1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 54-55a. (Rev. Ed. 1948.)
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falls within the general definition of a sale. But because the court found, as a
matter of law, that the transfer of blood was incidental to the service rendered, 5
the plaintiff is precluded from offering evidence to show as a matter of fact that the
blood was sold.
Whether service predominates in any particular transaction would seem to be
largely a question of fact and not of law. This is especially true in New York where
the hospitals do not render medical service.
"Such a hospital undertakes not to heal or attempt to heal through the agency of
others, but merely to supply others who will heal on their own responsibility." 6
"The hospital undertakes to procure for the patient the services of a nurse. It does
not undertake through the agency of nurses to render these services itself." 7
If a hospital orderly undertakes to perform even a slight service, such as placing
a hot water bottle in bed with a patient, he is an independent contractor and the
hospital is not liable for his negligent acts, although the acts were obviously within
the scope of his employment.8
It then appears that the defendant hospital in the Perlmutter case could not render
any service, but merely supplied the blood to the plaintiff for a price. This then was a
sale of the blood. Therefore, it is submitted that the court erred in not permitting the
plaintiff to offer evidence of such a sale.
Assuming there was no sale of the blood, but only a servicing of the plaintiff
with impure blood, the plaintiff has still stated a good cause of action. Plaintiff
cannot take advantage of the implied warranty of section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act,
because the implied warranty of this section is limited to sales transactions. However,
this does not mean that all actions based upon implied warranties are restricted to
sales. Implied warranties are found in other transactions such as: bailments, short term
leases, and in contracts in which service predominates and transfer of property is
incidental.'
The court in the Perlmutter case stated that the plaintiff failed because she did
not show a sale. She showed instead a contract in which service predominated and
transfer of property was incidental. Since such a contract may carry an implied
warranty of fitness the question then before the court was, did this contract carry
such an implied warranty?
There are two types of implied warranty. One is in the nature of a tort and the
other in contract. The implied warranty in tort is based upon representations of fact,
while the implied warranty in contract arises from a promise implied from the fact.10
The application of reliance is the basic distinction between the two. In a tort action
the plaintiff must show that he has relied upon the fact misrepresented. In a contract
action, the plaintiff must show that he has relied upon a promise given. This promise
may be expressed in words, or implied from conduct. The only difference between
' The court in the Perlmutter case has applied the test of predominance ". . . when service
predominates, and transfer of property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the trans-
action is not deemed a sale within the Sales Act." This is a test used to distinguish a contract
for work and labor from a contract of sale and the court cites 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 54-55a, which
has to do with contracts for work and labor. When the court refers to the contract between
Mrs. Perlmutter and the Beth David Hospital as a contract in which service predominates, they
liken it to a contract for work and labor.
* Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 236 N.Y. 268, 270, 140 N.E. 694, 695 (1923).
* Scholoendorff v. Soc. of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 132, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914).
'Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
'Miller v. Winters, 144 N.Y.S. 351; Gedding v. Marsh, 1 K.B. 668 (1920) ; VOLD, SALES
§§152-53 (1931).
"0 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. RaV. 1 (1888) ; 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 195; Prosser, Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 118 (1943).
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an expressed promise and an implied promise is in the manner in which the promise
is proved.
Suppose A goes to B's seed store and asks for rape seed and B sells A mustard
seed. As a result A suffers loss. If A is to recover in an action based on contract,
he must show that B has promised this seed to be rape seed. B, by offering this seed
to A in response to A's request for rape seed, has impliedly promised this seed
to be rape seed. The effect of B's conduct is the same as though he had expressly
stated: "I promise this seed to be rape seed." In the one case the promise is found
in the words used by B and in the other the promise is inferred from B's conduct.
A patient who agrees to pay $60 for blood to be used in a transfusion is bargaining
for blood fit for such a purpose. A hospital which undertakes to furnish blood for
this purpose impliedly promises that the blood furnished is fit for a transfusion.
The patient in effect has asked to be furnished with wholesome blood. From the
conduct of the hospital in furnishing the blood, a promise may be inferred that this
blood is wholesome. If the blood which the hospital furnishes is not wholesome, the
hospital has breached its promise and is liable to the patient for the damage which
results.
Suppose the Ajax department store holds a package to be delivered to Mr.
Smith and Mr. Jones tells the clerk that he is Mr. Smith and so gains possession of the
package. Mr. Jones has represented himself to be Mr. Smith. This is a misrepresentation
of fact. If the Ajax department store is to recover in an action of tort, they need
not show that Jones promised to be Smith, but rather that Jones represented himself
to be Smith and that Ajax reasonably relied upon this misrepresentation.
A hospital which induces a patient to part with $60 by furnishing blood for a
transfusion represents that the blood so furnished is fit. If the blood is not fit, the
hospital has made a misrepresentation of fact, and the patient who has relied upon
this misrepresentation should recover for the damage which results.
A single act may constitute both a misrepresentation and a breach of implied
promise. The hospital in furnishing the unwholesome blood to the plaintiff breached
its implied promise that the blood was fit and also misrepresented unwholesome
blood to be wholesome blood. Since either a breach of implied promise or a misrepre-
sentation may result in liability, those using the term "implied warranty" seldom
distinguish the type of implied warranty to which they are referring.
The courts have further added to the confusion by finding an implied warranty
where there is neither a breach of promise, nor the necessary reliance to constitute a
misrepresentation. They have thus created an implied warranty based upon policy.
When the court thinks it better policy that one of the innocent persons suffer the loss,
it may impose this liability by finding a warranty. Such a warranty is not implied,
but is more accurately termed an imposed warranty.1 '
This imposed warranty has been found in the more candid opinions of cases
involving the liability of a restaurateur who serves unwholesome food to his cus-
tomers. In these cases the courts have been unwilling to base the liability of the
restaurateur upon the narrow question of whether the transaction technically amounted
to a sale. The customer who orders a roll for breakfast and breaks his tooth upon a
pebble imbedded in it has a broken tooth regardless of whether the roll was sold
or furnished incidently to the service rendered. If the court thinks the one furnishing
the roll ought to be liable, they impose this liability by finding a breach of implied
warranty.
1 2
11Prosser, Warranty of Merchantable Quality, supra note 10.
1 Cushing v. Rodman, 82 Fed.2d 864 (1913) ; VOLD, SALES §§ 152-53 (1931).
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